

19 January 1955

## FAILURE OF COSTA RICAN REVOLT

- I. Apparent failure of Costa Rican revolt clearly in US interest--NOT because of merits or demerits of governments concerned, but because successful repetition of "Guatemala-type" coup would have provided dangerous precedent.
- II. As to specifics in Costa Rica -
  - A. Only area still held by rebels is in extreme northwest.
    1. Have some 500 men in area of La Cruz.
  - B. Against these, government has about 1,400 troops from town of Liberia northward some 30 miles.
    1. Government announced on 18 January that it had pushed rebels back north of Santa Rosa.
    2. Government unit reported preparing to cut rebel escape route north of La Cruz.
  - C. Rebel "air force" collapsing.
    1. Transport (C-47), piloted by American Jerry Delarm, destroyed in crash landing.
    2. Two AT-6's returned to Nicaragua, spotted by OAS observers, after which President Somoza sheepishly "interned" them.
    3. Fighter (F-47) has disappeared and is believed to be back in Guatemala.
    4. Thus, little threat of further rebel air action.

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EXEMPT NO. 26  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE:                       
AUTH:                       
DATE: 12 Jan 80 REVIEWER:                     

25X1

**III. Internal support for rebels didn't develop.**

- A. Majority of Costa Ricans have no love for former presidents Calderon Guardia and Picado (in whose names rebels acting), because of their:**
  - 1. Opportunistic alliance with Communists in 1944-48.
  - 2. Close association with Somoza since 1948.
  - 3. Dictatorial tendencies.
- B. Costa Ricans generally support government.**
  - 1. Even followers of Ulate (opposition leader and former president) have volunteered to fight "invaders."
  - 2. Ulate, like Figueres, is old enemy of Calderon and Picado.
- C. No defections reported from Civil Guard, which led by men of unquestioned loyalty to Figueres.**

**IV. Collapse of revolt will not end bad blood between Costa Rica and neighbors.**

- A. Nicaraguan and Venezuelan leaders, who sponsored revolt, still determined eliminate Figueres.**

25X6

- B. Somoza of Nicaragua himself a target for assassins. Opposition (Conservative Party) allegedly plotting against him-**

25X6

- V. Prompt action has raised OAS prestige, although Latin "dictators" resent what they consider US "intervention."**

- A. Venezuela, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic may claim action was interference.
- B. However, others--notably Uruguay, Ecuador--and "liberal-democratic" opinion throughout hemisphere will support OAS action.

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19 Jan. 1955

## COSTA RICAN REVOLT

- I. Apparent failure Costa Rican revolt clearly in US interest--NOT because of merits or demerits governments concerned, but because successful repetition "Guatemala-type" coup would be dangerous precedent.
- II. As to specifics in Costa Rica -
  - A. Only rebel area left is in extreme northwest.
    1. 500 men in area of La Cruz.
  - B. Government moving against these, with 1,400 troops (from town of Liberia northward some 30 miles).
    1. Government announced (18 Jan) rebels pushed back north of Santa Rosa.
    2. Government hopes cut rebel escape route north of La Cruz.

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C. Rebel "air force" collapsing.

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3. Fighter (F-47) has disappeared--believed back in Guatemala.
4. Thus, little threat further rebel air action.

III. Internal support for rebels didn't develop.

- A. Majority Costa Ricans have no love for former presidents Calderon Guardia and Picado (in whose names rebels acting), due their:
  1. Alliance Communists '44-48.
  2. Close association Somoza since '48.
  3. Dictatorial tendencies.

-2-

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B. Costa Ricans generally support government.

1. Even followers of Ulate (opposition leader, ex-president) volunteered fight "invaders."
2. Ulate, like Figueres, old enemy Calderon/Picado.

C. No defections reported from Civil Guard, which led by men loyal to Figueres.

IV. Revolt's end does not mean end bad blood between Costa Rica and neighbors.

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25X6

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